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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILE - NEGLIGENCE - KEY LEFT IN IGNITION AS PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF INJURIES RESULTING FROM THIEF'S NEGLIGENT DRIVING - Plaintiff al-
leged that the defendant left her automobile unattended and unlocked with
the key in the ignition on a San Francisco street and that a thief stole the
car and negligently collided with the plaintiff's motorcycle. A motion for
nonsuit was granted below on the ground that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action.' On appeal it was held, one justice dissenting, that judg-
ment be affirmed. The owner of the car was under no duty to persons who
may be injured by its use to keep it out of the hands of a third person, in
the absence of facts putting the owner on notice that the third persort was
incompetent to handle it. Richards v. Stanley, 271 P. 2d 23 (Cal.1954)
In the absence of a statute or ordinance, the majority of the courts have
denied recovery against the owner for injuries occasioned by the negligent
operation of an automobile by a thief.2 The reason generally given is that the
proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of the thief and not that of
the owner of the automobile, 3 the courts proceeding from the premise that
the intervening criminal act of the thief breaks the chain of causation, 4 or that
one is only held accountable for the natural and probable results of his neg-
ligent act. 5 In jurisdictions having statutes imposing liability for leaving the
key in the ignition, diametrically opposed results have been reached. Ney
v. Yellow Cab Co.6 held that the statute was a public safety measure and
that its violation was prima facie evidence of negligence, and since the
criminal act of the thief could have been foreseen, the causal chain was not
broken. Similar results have been reached in Tennessee T and the District
of Columbia.8 The District of Columbia court reasoned that the statute was en-
acted to promote the safety of the public in the streets, and its violation
1. Trial court ruled inapplicable a city ordinance which forbade automobile owners
to leave automobilt unlocked and unattended with keys in ignition but provided that
the violation thereof sh6uld have no effect in a civil action. Instant case at page 25.
2. Cockrell v. Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N.E.2d 878 (1951); Roberts v. Lundy,
301 Mich. 726, 4 N.W.2d 74 (1942); Latito v. Kyriacus, 272 App. Div. 635, 74 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1947); Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App. Div. 891, 56 N.Y.S.2d 157, affi'd, 295
N.Y. 667, 65 N.E.2d 101 (1945).
3. Wilson v. Harrington, supra note 2; See 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law and Practice §2534 n.26 (Perm. ed. 1946).
4. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1951); Curtiss v. Jacobson, 142 Me.
351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (1951);
Restatement, Torts §448 (1934).
5. Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921); Reti v. Vaniska Inc., 14 N.J.
Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (1951); Latito v. Kyriacus, supra note 2, Prudential Society v.
Ray, 207 App. Div. 496, 202 N.Y. Supp 614 (1924).
6. 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); accord, Ostergard v. Frisch, 33 Ill. App. 359,
77 N.E. 2d 537 (1948); Moran v. Borden Co., 309 Ill. App. 391, 33 N.E.2d 166 (1941).
7. Morris v. Boiling, 31 Tenn. App. 577, 218 S.W.2d 754 (1948).
8. Schaff v. R. W. Claxton Inc., 144 F. 2d 532 (D.C.Cir. 1944), aff'd after :sew
trial, 169 F.2d 303 (D.C.Cir. 1944); Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C.Cir. 1943)
cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944) (These are the leading cases in which recovery
was allowed.). The decision of Howard v. Swagart; 161 F.2d 651 (D.C.Cir. 1947)
would seem to indicate that the District of Columbia courts are unwilling to extend he
Hartman doctrine to its logical conclusion. There, the owner left his car in a parking
garage wth the keys in the ignition and an employee of the garage loaned the car to a
fellow employee who had no knowledge of the theft. The latter, while driving it some
12 hours after the theft, injured the plaintiff who brought suit against the garage owner.
The court was of the opinion that to extend the principle of the Ross and Schaff casev
to such a case "would result in a strained construction of the legal concepts pertaining
to proximate cause.").
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constituted negligence per se. This negligence created the hazard and there-
by brought about the very harm which the statute was intended to prevent,
and thus constituted the proximate cause of the injury.9 A directly op-
posite result was reached in Massachusetts 10 and Minnesota," these courts
reasoning that the statute is merely an anti-theft measure and the injury
to a third person is not within the harm which the enactment was intended
to prevent.
While the act of leaving the key in the ignition may be considered neg-
ligence as to one's proprietary interest in the automobile, it is fundamental
in our jurisprudence that the fact of negligence does not create a legal lia-
bility unless some duty was owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and
there was a breach of this duty resulting in injury to the plaintiff.12 While
the defendant was under a duty not to create an unreasonable risk which
would result in injury to the plaintiff, to hold him' liable here would impose
a further duty to control the action of a third person. 1 :
Though it is well recognized that a duty of care may be imposed by leg-
islative enactment, the courts have been unanimous in holding that there is
no liability unless the plaintiff is one of the class of persons whom the statute
was intended to protect, and the harm that occurred is of thq type which
it was intended to prevent.14 None of the statutes in the jurisdictions which
allow recovery expressly discloses for what purpose the statute was enacted.
The majority of the courts which have expressly considered the question
of duty have concluded that there is no duty to one to whom no harm can
9. "Negligence is the breach of a legal duty. It is immaterial whether the duty "s
one imposed by the rule of common law . .. or is imposed by a statute designed for the
protection of othcs. . . . [T]he only difference is that in the one case the measure of
legal duty is to be determined upon common law principles, while in the other the
statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of "neg-
ligence, or in other words, negligence per se .... All that the statute does is to establish
a fixed standard by which the fact of negligence may be determined." Mitchell, J., -n
Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N.W. 543 (1889). Violation of an
applicable statute is negligence per se, Scarborough v. Central Arizona Light & P. Co.,
58 Ariz. 51, 117 P.2d 487 (1941); Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney Inc., 199 S.C. 500, 20
S.E.2d 153 (1942); Schuman v. Bank of Calif., 114 Ore. 336, 233 Pac. 860 (1925).
Violation of a statute or ordinance is evidence of negligence. Hansen v. Kemmish, 201
Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926); Simonsen v. Thorin, 120 Neb. 684, 234 N.W. 628
(1931); Prosser on Torts, §39 (1941).
10. Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E. 2d 560 (1948); Sullivan v. Griffin,
318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E. 2d 330 (1945); Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158
N.E. 778 (1927) (In 1941 it seemed that Massachusetts was adopting the minority
rule. In Malloy v. Neuman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E.2d 1001 (1941), a recovery was
allowed where th2 automobile involved was not registered in the -state. This case was
subsequently overruled by the later decisions).
11. Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W. 2d 272 (1950); Wannebo v.
Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695 (1948); Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76, 198
N.W. 302 (1934).
12. Morril v. Mcrril, 104 N.JL. 557, 142 At. 337 (1922); Munroe v. Pennsylvania
Ry. Co., 85 N.J.L. 688, 90' AtI. 254 (1914); Palsgraf v. Long Island By. Co., 248 N.Y.
339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); See Buckland, The Duty to Take Care, 51 L. Q. Rev. 637
(1935);'Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 Col. L. Rev. 1014 (1928),
29 Col. L. Rev. 255 (1929); Prosser on Torts, §31 (1941).
13. Generally one is not bound to control the acts of a third person in the absence
of a special relationship. Lane v. Bing, 202 Cal. 590, 262 Pac. 318 (1927); Kebr v.
Central Brewing Co. of N.Y., 150 N.Y. Svpp., 986 (1915); Restatement, Torts §315
(1934); Prosser on Torts §32 (1941).
14 Restatement, Torts §285, 286 (1934); Prosser on Torts, §39 (1941); 32 Col.
L. Rev. 712 (1932); 19 Minn. L. Rev. 666 (1935).
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be foreseen.15 However, the greater number of cases have failed to con-
sider the question of duty and use the language of proximate cause. In
any case, the ultimate question should be whether the negligent act and
the injury which resulted are so related that liability should be imposedla6
The prevailing view, of course, is that one is liable for any injury which re-
sults from his negligent act if the injury was the natural and probable result
of the negligent act.
1 7
It has been held that the proximate cause of the injury in cases similar
to the instant case was not the theft but rather the unskillful handling of
the vehicle by the thief.18 The key in the automobile did no harm. Before
any injury could result there had to be some illegal act of a third person,
and generally one is not bound to anticipate that some person will disobey
the law.1o Even if the automobile owner could have foreseen that his act
of leaving the keys in the automobile would induce a thief to steal the
automobile, certainly one should not say that he was bound to foresee that
the thief would be a careless driver. Such a statement would seem con-
trary to common experience; it would seem that car thieves, in order to avoid
attention would drive with extreme care. There may be circumstances
however, such as leaving an automobile unlocked with the key in the ig-
nition in front of a school, where one might reasonably anticipate that some
injury could result,20 due to the possibility that the automobile may fall into
the hands of an immature driver.
HAROLD W. E. ANDERSON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EMINENT DOMAIN - PRIVATE V. PUBLIC USE. -
The City and County of San Francisco sought to condemn certain property
for the purpose of leasing it for a term of not less than twenty-five years
to a private citizen who was to construct and operate a parking garage
thereon. The City Controller refused to certify to the availability of funds
for this purpose, contending, inter alia, that the proposed use was not a
public one. In a mandamus proceeding by the City the court held, that the
application for the writ be denied. Since the City was to retain no control
over the rates to be charged by the lessee, the proposed use was private
rather than public. City and County of San Francisco v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529
(Cal.1955).
15. Sinram v. Pcnnsylvania Ry. Co., 61 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1932); Palsgraf v. Long
Island Ry. Co., supra note 12; Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. .197
(1935); Prosser on Torts, 186 n. 95 (1941).
16. Prosser on Torts §§31,45 (1941).
17. Kiste v. Red Cab Co., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E. 2d 395 (1952); Palsgraf
v. Long Island Ry. Co., supra note 12. Contra, Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223,
234 N.W. 372 (1931).
18. Wilson v. Harrington, supra note 2; 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law
& Practice, §2534 n.26 (Perm. ed. 1946).
19. Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 264 P.2d 1 (1953); Curtiss v. Jacobson, 142
Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947), See Babbitt, The Law Applied to Motor Vehicles §553
(1946); Restatement, Torts, §447 (1934). "There is usually much less reason to an-
ticipate acts which arc malicious or criminal than those which are merely :segligent.
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not to be expected that anyone will :ntentionally
. steal an autoiobile and run a man down with it." Prosser on Torts, §37 11.90 (1941).
20. Restatement, Torts §302 Illus. 7 (1934).
